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ANTITRUST AND HIGH TECH: A TALE OF TWO MERGERS
Babette Boliek*
ABSTRACT
Between 2016 and 2019, two proposed mergers captured much of the
attention and resources of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The first was the vertical merger of AT&T Inc. and Time Warner Inc.—
a merger of a communications, media, and content distribution company
(AT&T) with a content provider (Time Warner). The second was the horizontal
merger of Sprint and T-Mobile—a merger of two mobile telephone companies.
In general, vertical mergers are reviewed with greater leniency than horizontal
mergers because the latter, by definition, eliminate a competitor in the relevant
marketplace, which is not a concern with the former. Moreover, merger-specific
efficiencies may be easier to demonstrate when a company merges with another
company in its own supply chain. Even so, the DOJ challenged the vertical
merger of AT&T and Time Warner but permitted (with conditions) the horizontal
merger of Sprint and T-Mobile. As this Article sets forth, these seemingly distinct
mergers were destined to be linked.
Even though the DOJ unsuccessfully blocked the AT&T-Time Warner
merger, the companies are separating again only a few short years after
finalizing their merger. The stated reason for the unwinding is arguably linked
to the DOJ’s decision to permit the T-Mobile-Sprint merger. The competitive
pressure created by the joined mobile telephone company—T-Mobile—has
pressured AT&T to invest further in its own mobile telephone business. In other
words, the DOJ’s initial fear that the merged AT&T could use theoretical market
power to anticompetitively charge higher consumer prices and raise rivals’
costs in content distribution was never realized. In contrast, the DOJ’s humility
in assessing potential efficiencies for a merged T-Mobile in the growing 5G
mobile telephone market is already paying competitive dividends. The tale of
these two mergers, therefore, provides interesting insights into modern merger
review policies.

*
Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (2020-2021), Chief Economist of the
Federal Communications Commission (2018-2019), J.D. Columbia University School of Law, Ph.D.
Economics, University of California, Davis. The analysis and opinions provided here are those of the author and
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Hood for her excellent research, insights, and edits that made this project possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Inside antitrust circles and even in popular press, there is renewed interest in
antitrust law, policy, goals, and application.1 In no arena is antitrust discussion
more intense than with respect to treatment of high-tech industries2—a broad
category that includes telecommunications, digital platforms, and digital
application companies. More specifically, popular concerns with these
companies and industries are that they are highly concentrated or dominant in
1
See, e.g., Chris Cumming, Antitrust Regulators Fix Their Sights on Private Equity, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 30, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrust-regulators-fix-their-sights-on-private-equity11632999600?page=2 (“New federal antitrust enforcers want to toughen up regulation of the private-equity
industry, putting a spotlight on ways that buyout firms might be warping competition.”); Brent Kendall, FTC
Moves Toward Stricter Antitrust Scrutiny of Vertical Mergers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2021, 5:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-moves-toward-stricter-antitrust-scrutiny-of-vertical-mergers-11631741589?
page=3 (“A divided Federal Trade Commission on Wednesday withdrew guidelines adopted just last year on
how the government reviews so-called vertical mergers of companies that don’t directly compete with one
another, the latest signal the agency is looking to escalate antitrust scrutiny of deal making.”).
2
See, e.g., Tim Higgins, Apple Filing Notice of Appeal in Epic Antitrust Case, Looks to Stay In-App
Injunction, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-filing-notice-of-appeal-in-epic-antitrust-case-looks-to-stayin-app-injunction-11633734000 (Oct. 8, 2021, 7:49 PM) (stating Apple’s plan to appeal the ruling in its antitrust
suit against Epic Games, Inc.); Brent Kendall, Facebook Seeks Dismissal of Government’s Do-Over Antitrust
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-dismissal-of-governmentsdo-over-antitrust-lawsuit-11633381158?page=1 (“Facebook Inc. filed a new motion Monday seeking the dismissal of a
government antitrust case alleging the company engaged in unlawful monopolization, four months after it succeeded in
getting an earlier version of the complaint thrown out.”).
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their field in such a way that consumers are left with few options—a position
that may translate to higher consumer prices, lower quality or less variety of
products, and less industry innovation. These concentration concerns translate
into a renewed focus on merger analysis and a push for antitrust enforcers to
slow industry concentration by imposing stricter limits on merger approval.3
Mergers are typically described as being horizontal or vertical in nature.4 By
their very nature, horizontal mergers—mergers among and between rivals—
result in the loss of one competitor in the relevant industry, which means the
post-merger industry will be more concentrated.5 In part due to the recognition
of this concern, horizontal mergers that reach certain concentration metrics have
long faced more intensive scrutiny than some smaller horizontal mergers.6 In
contrast, vertical mergers—mergers between and among companies in the
upstream or downstream supply chain—may not create similar, immediate
concentration concerns and often benefit consumers (for example, by increasing
production and distribution efficiencies).7 Because a vertical merger does not
have the same immediate and direct impact on competition as a horizontal
merger, and procompetitive, merger-specific efficiencies from a vertical merger
may be easier to demonstrate, vertical mergers have been challenged less
aggressively than horizontal mergers.8
In recent years, however, all mergers, including vertical mergers, have
received increasing interest from various, bipartisan circles.9 An example
discussed here is the AT&T-Time Warner merger, first announced in 2016 and
the first vertical merger challenged in decades by the then Republican-led
3
See Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of Antitrust, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/technology/big-tech-antitrust-bills.html (June 29, 2021) (“House
lawmakers . . . introduced sweeping antitrust legislation aimed at restraining the power of Big Tech and staving
off corporate consolidation. If passed, the bills would be the most ambitious update to monopoly laws in
decades.”).
4
For information on horizontal and vertical mergers, see generally U.S DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/
hmg-2010.pdf; U.S DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/
vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf.
5
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4.
6
See id.
7
See VERTICAL MERGE GUIDELINES, supra note 4
8
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345–46 (1962); see infra notes 35, 36 and
accompanying text.
9
See generally Brent Kendall, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects Justice Department Antitrust Challenge to
AT&T-Time Warner Deal, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-appeals-court-rejects-justice-departmentantitrust-challenge-to-at-t-time-warner-deal-11551194524 (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:55 PM) (describing the DOJ’s first
vertical merger challenge in forty years).
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Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ).10 Broadly stated, the DOJ
became concerned that the combination of Time Warner’s media content with
AT&T’s media distribution systems would lead AT&T to raise prices and deny
other media distributors access to Time Warner content.11 Although vertical
strategies are often considered to have either procompetitive or neutral effects
on competition, the DOJ decided to seek a court injunction to stop the merger.12
This challenge, novel in certain regards, failed in court, and the DOJ did not
secure an injunction; the resulting merger was consummated in 2018.13
But the merger was short lived. The post-merger entity, AT&T, announced
in 2021 that it would unwind its Time Warner legacy division (WarnerMedia)
and merge that division with Discovery to form a new, media-only company.14
AT&T stated that its reason for the sale of the recently purchased assets was to
concentrate on its core mobile telecommunications business.15 In other words,
competitive market pressures drove AT&T to abandon a vertical integration
strategy that proved unsuccessful, even though that strategy had concerned the
DOJ so much that it challenged the merger in court.16 The quick, post-merger
divestiture evidenced that the DOJ suit was unnecessary—the DOJ had arguably
committed a Type I error: it made a false prediction that the merger was likely
to lessen competition.17

10

See id.
See id.
12
See id.
13
See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 254 (D.D.C. 2018); Edmund Lee & Cecilia
Kang, AT&T Closes Acquisition of Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/14/business/media/att-time-warner-injunction.html (announcing the completion of AT&T’s $85.4 billion
acquisition of Time Warner).
14
Steve Kovach & Sam Meredith, AT&T Announces $43 Billion Deal to Merge WarnerMedia with
Discovery, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/17/att-to-combine-warnermedia-and-discovery-assets-tocreate-a-new-standalone-company.html (May 17, 2021, 4:03 PM) (“Telecom giant AT&T announced Monday
a deal to combine its content unit WarnerMedia with Discovery, paving the way for one of Hollywood’s biggest
studios to compete with media giants Netflix and Disney.”).
15
Press Release, AT&T, AT&T’s WarnerMedia and Discovery, Inc. Creating Standalone Company by
Combining Operations to Form New Global Leader in Entertainment (May 17, 2021) (available at
https://about.att.com/story/2021/warnermedia_discovery.html) (stating that AT&T and its shareholders will
benefit from AT&T’s capital structure “as one of the best . . . 5G and fiber broadband companies in the United
States” after AT&T’s closing with WarnerMedia).
16
Kovach & Meredith, supra note 14 (“If approved by regulators, the [WarnerMedia and Discovery] deal
effectively reverses AT&T’s years-long plan to combine content and distribution in a vertically integrated
company.”).
17
In the context of mergers, antitrust enforcers look to predict and prevent mergers that may
“substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.” See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2021). When reviewing a merger, the enforcers may assess the potential merger correctly, or the enforcers may
commit a Type I error (predict that a procompetitive merger is uncompetitive, or a false positive) or a Type II
error (predict an anticompetitive merger is harmless, or a false negative). Joshua D. Wright & Murat C. Mungan,
11
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Although market realities, not the DOJ, ultimately ended the AT&T-Time
Warner merger, as set forward below,18 the DOJ arguably aided the competitive
market forces that forced AT&T’s hand by approving the T-Mobile-Sprint
merger, which ultimately drove AT&T to compete more vigorously in the race
to build a nationwide 5G network. Specifically, the DOJ assessed a large,
horizontal merger close in time to the AT&T-Time Warner vertical merger. In
2018, the largest horizontal merger of two mobile telecommunications
companies was announced: the T-Mobile-Sprint merger.19 As noted, while the
DOJ challenged the AT&T-Time Warner vertical merger,20 the DOJ ultimately
approved the T-Mobile-Sprint horizontal merger.21 It is this second merger
between T-Mobile and Sprint that arguably planted the competitive seeds that
helped accomplish indirectly (by forcing AT&T to focus on building a 5G
network) what the DOJ could not accomplish directly—the end of the AT&TTime Warner merger.
Looking back at these two mergers with the benefit of hindsight, this paper
provides an outline of the complexity of merger review and a humble reminder
that while antitrust regulators may not be infallible, competition itself can step
in as the ultimate discipliner of corporate aspiration. This paper is set forth as
follows. Part I describes Merger One: the AT&T-Time Warner merger.22 This
description provides the background of the merger, the underlying legal and
economic theories that led to the DOJ’s decision to file suit to enjoin the merger,
and the final court results. Part II describes of Merger Two: the T-Mobile-Sprint

The Easterbrook Theorem: An Application to Digital Markets, 130 YALE L.J.F. 622, 623 (2021). Arguably, a
Type I error is more problematic than a Type II error as it stops procompetitive mergers absolutely, but a Type
II error might be ultimately corrected by competitive market forces. See generally Babette Boliek, Type I vs Type
II Errors: Antitrust Lessons for Communications Policy, AEI (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.aei.org/technologyand-innovation/telecommunications/type-vs-type-ii-errors-antitrust-lessons-communications-policy/ (applying
antitrust Type I and Type II error analysis to regulatory decision making).
18
See Lauren Feiner, AT&T Battled the DOJ to Buy Time Warner, Only to Spin it Out Again Three Years
Later, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/17/att-fought-doj-for-time-warner-only-to-spin-out-three-yearslater.html (May 17, 2021, 1:30 PM).
19
See Press Release, T-Mobile, T-Mobile and Sprint to Combine, Accelerating 5G Innovation &
Increasing Competition (Apr. 29, 2018) (available at https://www.t-mobile.com/news/press/5gforall).
20
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Challenges AT&T/DirecTV’s Acquisition of
Time Warner (Nov. 20, 2017) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-challengesattdirectv-s-acquisition-time-warner).
21
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed
Merger by Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish (July 26, 2019) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-settles-t-mobile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package) (announcing an agreement
between the DOJ, the Attorneys Generals for five states, and T-Mobile and Sprint to settle their case if the
companies make a divesture to Dish).
22
See infra Part I.
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merger.23 This description provides the background of the merger, the
underlying legal and economic theories that led to the DOJ’s decision (and the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision) to approve the merger,
and the post-merger progress. Part III provides a broad overview of the impact
of the T-Mobile-Sprint merger on AT&T and its corporate decision to unwind
its merger with Time Warner.24 In particular, Part III looks at the “tech” in hightech and shows that merger review is highly complicated and potentially more
susceptible to Type I errors (false positives) in industries driven by capitalintensive, dynamic, technological innovation. Finally, the Conclusion provides
observations of the difficulty of merger review and the harsh discipline of
dynamic, high-tech, competitive markets.25

I.

THE DOJ AND MERGER ONE: AT&T AND TIME WARNER

A brief summary of the AT&T and Time Warner saga is as follows. On
October 22, 2016, AT&T announced an agreement to acquire Time Warner.26
The DOJ challenged this proposed merger, resulting in a multi-year inquiry.27
Finally, on June 15, 2018, AT&T officially completed the merger and acquired
Timer Warner.28 However, only three years later, AT&T announced a split with
the rebranded WarnerMedia and sold the company to Discovery.29 The speed of
the unraveling begs some questions: Were the economic concerns regarding the
merger incomplete or overblown? Was the decision to spend administrative time
and money on litigating the merger flawed and overly aggressive? Part I takes a
quick look at the transaction, the economic concerns of potential anticompetitive
market power, and the DOJ litigation.
A. Background of the AT&T-Time Warner Merger
As noted, AT&T and Time Warner first announced their intent to merge in
2016.30 AT&T is well known as a communications industry and Time Warner,

23

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T to Acquire Time Warner (Oct. 22, 2016) (available at https://about.
att.com/story/att_to_acquire_time_warner.html).
27
See Press Release, T-Mobile, supra note 19.
28
See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Completes Acquisition of Time Warner Inc. (June 15, 2018)
(available at https://about.att.com/story/att_completes_acquisition_of_time_warner_inc.html); Nathan Reiff,
AT&T and Time Warner Merger Case: What You Need to Know, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.
investopedia.com/investing/att-and-time-warner-merger-case-what-you-need-know/.
29
See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 15.
30
See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 26.
24
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Inc. is a household name in content production. Less well known is that AT&T
also owns content distribution systems through its cellular network, its U-Verse
fiber-optic service, and DirecTV’s satellite subscription services.31 The closest
competitor to DirecTV is Dish Network; the next closest competitors are the
various cable distributors around the nation such as Comcast and Spectrum,
amongst others, that compete with all the AT&T content distribution systems.32
The merger of AT&T, a holder of content distribution assets, and Time Warner,
a content producer, is properly characterized as a vertical merger.33 In many
regards, vertical mergers have gone unchallenged unless there were strong
concerns that the merger might “substantially lessen competition,” for example,
by foreclosing rivals’ access to an essential input in the upstream supply chain
or access to downstream distributors or customers.34 The more concentrated the
industry, and the more difficult it is for new entrants to enter the industry, the
more heightened are these concerns. In the alternative, however, vertical
mergers are often considered pro-competitive because a combined company
may more efficiently serve consumers, whether by lowering prices, controlling
quality, streaming distribution, or leveraging other innovations.35
In this case, the proposed merger was overwhelmingly vertical in nature.36
Applying the consumer welfare standard to review the merger for potential harm

31
See Thomas Gryta, AT&T Closes $49 Billion DirecTV Buy, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2015, 3:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-closes-49-billion-directv-acquisition-1437766932 (stating AT&T acquired
DirecTV for $49 billion in 2015, “create[ing] the largest U.S. pay-television company” at the time). But see
Catie Keck, AT&T Has Officially Spun Off DirecTV, Which Is Now Its Own Business, VERGE (Aug. 3, 2021,
7:46 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/3/22608577/att-directv-tpg-deal-u-verse-att-tv-new-company
(noting AT&T’s announcement from early 2021 to spin off DirecTV, AT&T TV, and U-verse into a separate
new company that AT&T would co-manage alongside TPG Capital).
32
See Dish Network Competitors, CRAFT, https://craft.co/dish-network/competitors (last visited Apr. 22,
2022) (“Dish Network’s top competitors include DIRECTV, Comcast, Sky, and Liberty Global.”).
33
See David Shepardson & Jessica Toonkel, AT&T-Time Warner May Signal Start of New Media
Industry Consolidation, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2016, 8:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-time-warner-ma-at-t-consolidation-an/att-time-warner-may-signal-start-of-new-media-industry-consolidationidUSKCN12N0GD (“Media firms face pressure to access distribution as more younger viewers cut their cable
cords and watch their favorite shows on mobile devices. Distribution companies, meanwhile, see acquiring
content as a way to diversify revenue.”).
34
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . where in any line
of commerce . . . , the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition . . . .”).
35
See VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 11. The FTC recently withdrew the Vertical
Merger Guidelines on September 15, 2021, and plans to work with the DOJ to “review and update the agencies’
merger guidance.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Withdraws Vertical Merger
Guidelines and Commentary (Sept. 15, 2021) (available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021
/09/federal-trade-commission-withdraws-vertical-merger-guidelines).
36
Some mergers exhibit both vertical and horizontal attributes. Scrutiny in those instances often focuses
primarily on the horizontal aspects of the merger. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343,
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to competition and consumers,37 the DOJ exhibited strong concern over the
content element of the merger.38 Described in more detail below, the DOJ
considered AT&T’s control over Time Warner content to be a potential
anticompetitive lever that it might exercise against rival content distributors to
the advantage of its own content distribution interests.39 This and other economic
concerns led the DOJ to file a complaint in district court seeking an injunction
to halt the merger.40 This was a unique move, as the DOJ had not filed such a
complaint to stop a vertical merger in over forty years.41
B. The DOJ’s Decision to Enjoin AT&T and Time Warner
The DOJ’s economic theory that the merger between AT&T and Time
Warner would harm consumers and competition may be summarized in three
main arguments. The first theory put forth by the DOJ in court was that the
merged company would raise the price of Time Warner content charged to other
distributors (cable companies) and that those higher costs would in turn be
passed on to consumers.42 Specifically, the DOJ was concerned that the
combination of Time Warner’s content networks, such as CNN, TNT, and TBS,
with AT&T’s video distributors, U-verse and DirecTV, would allow the merged
company to charge their rivals higher prices for this content.43 The ultimate fear
was that these higher costs would be felt by consumers.44
The second theory centered on the potential of opportunistic use of content
blackouts. All content distributers negotiate terms (payments) to content

346 (1962).
37
For a description of the consumer welfare standard, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
38
See Complaint at 16–17, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17CV-02511). The DOJ expressed concern that if the merger between AT&T and Time Warner were to occur, “the
merged company could ‘more credibly threaten to withhold’ Turner’s popular programming—including the hit
shows and live sporting events carried by TNT, TBS, and Cartoon Network—as leveraged in its negotiations
with MVPDs and virtual MVPDs.” Id.
39
Interestingly, similar content and distribution concerns were raised in the 2011 merger between
Comcast and NBC. In that case, the DOJ approved the merger with commitments made on mandatory content
licensing, arbitration of content rights disputes, and non-discrimination conditions. See Press Release, Dep’t of
Just., Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011)
(available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceedconditions).
40
See Complaint, supra note 38.
41
See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1278–79 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(demonstrating how the DOJ was unsuccessful in stopping the merger).
42
United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 198 (D.D.C. 2018).
43
Id.
44
Id.
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providers for the right to carry that content.45 If there is a failure to meet a
negotiated price before the current contract expires, the content is “blacked
out.”46 Basically, the DOJ’s blackout theory was that if a rival content distributor
was negotiating prices for Time Warner content, AT&T could strategically use
any Time Warner blackout period on that distributor’s system to lure away that
rivals’ customers.47 In addition, AT&T could directly discourage its own
customers from switching to distributors that did not carry Time Warner
content.48 The DOJ’s economic expert, the University of California Berkeley
professor, Carl Shapiro, estimated that under the second theory, AT&T’s rival
distributors could cause rival companies to lose an estimated nine to fourteen
percent of their customers over time.49 However, the court found that “blackouts
are negative events for both programmers and distributors” and “there ha[d]
never been a long-term blackout of the Turner networks.”50
The third theory was that AT&T and rival distributor Comcast could
coordinate access restriction to Time Warner and NBC content to stifle
competition.51 In particular, coordination might look to limit competition from
online cable content distributors like Dish Network’s Sling TV or Sony’s
PlayStation Vue.52 Professor Shapiro theorized that even indirect (tacit)
coordination to limit online alternatives would harm consumer choice.53
C. The Results
Judge Leon of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
court wrote a ninety-four-page brief rejecting the DOJ’s complaint.54 Judge
Leon’s opinion has drawn both praise and criticism for its analysis of the
economic testimony.55 The criticism tends to lay in some unfortunate dicta,
45

See id. at 200.
Id. (“In the event an affiliate negotiation is unsuccessful, the distributor will lose the rights to display
the programmer’s content to its customers. . . . known in the industry as a programming ‘blackout’ . . . .”).
47
See id.
48
See id. at 201.
49
Id. at 225.
50
Id. at 200.
51
Id. at 194.
52
Id. at 242.
53
Id. at 246 (“[T]he Government further asserts [that] the companies could ‘mutually forbear’ from
licensing their programming content ‘without any communication between them.’” (citation omitted)).
54
See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. United States v.
AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
55
Compare Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash,
6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 459 (2018) (questioning Judge Leon’s critiques and description of the DOJ’s
economic analyses), with Joshua D. Wright & Jan Martin Rybnicek, AT&T/Time Warner Decision: The Triumph
of Economic Analysis, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (June 27, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/at-t46
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including an apparent dismissal of the DOJ’s use of common economic
bargaining models.56 But regardless of Judge Leon’s dicta, the economic theory
was arguably found too difficult and too sensitive to changes in underlying
assumptions to establish empirically. That, in the end, may have been the death
knell to the DOJ’s case. As for the blackout theory, economists at the FCC have
studied similar types of opportunistic use of blackouts among content
distributors and providers.57 For a public example, when analyzing the impact
of broadcaster mergers and retransmission fees, FCC economists have
considered how broadcaster consolidation increased broadcasters’ ability to
credibly use a “blackout” threat to increase retransmission fees (the fees
broadcasters charge cable and satellite companies).58 Even talented economists
with access to extensive industry reporting data acknowledge that conclusions
in this area are complicated and open to interpretation.59

time-warner-decision-the-triumph-of-economic-analysis (praising Judge Leon’s emphasis on “sound economic
analysis”).
56
See generally Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modelling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986) (clarifying that “certain interpretive ambiguities in the
axiomatic approach . . . provide a more solid grounding for applications of the Nash bargaining solution in
economic modelling”). The economic model in question was a Nash-bargaining model. As one writer describes
a Nash bargaining situation, imagine two parties are at an impasse. What is the right solution for reaching an
agreement?:
[Assume] [e]ach party has a disagreement point (also known as a threat point) which is a payoff
level in case no agreement is reached. Each party also has a utility function for how the party
feels about an outcome. . . . [As John Nash proved,] the outcome is the point that maximizes the
product of the two players utility over their disagreement point.
Presh Talwalkar, Nash Bargaining Solution–Game Theory Tuesdays, MIND YOUR DECISIONS (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2016/03/01/nash-bargaining-solution-game-theory-tuesdays/; see Salop,
supra note 55, at 462 (“Judge Leon did not reject Nash bargaining theory outright, but he strongly criticized the
premise that Time Warner executives would work to maximize the ‘joint profits’ of the vertically integrated
company, as if this were just an ‘economists’ assumption’ made for convenience, rather than a good description
of the real world.”).
57
See, e.g., Babette Boliek, Kim Makuch, Catherine A. Matraves & Aleks Yankelevich, Economics at
the FCC 2018-19: Competition, Broadband Deployment, and Transaction Review, 55 REV. INDUS. ORG 625,
633–36 (2019). The FCC regulates the communications industries, including cable, satellite, and cellular
companies. COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151. Relevant for this discussion, as part of its
regulatory rule, the FCC analyzes mergers when they involve a common carrier or the transfer of spectrum
licenses. 15 U.S.C. § 21.
58
See Boliek et al., supra note 57, at 633. Broadcasters arguably have “unique” content in that distributors
are required by law to carry their content. The findings showed that under certain conditions, the consolidation
of broadcasters might lead to higher retransmission rates. Id. at 637. However, another explanation for the
finding might also have been higher content production costs or the ability to push back on the pre-existing
market power of distributors. Id. at 638.
59
See id. at 633, 638 (discussing limitations on studies by the FCC).

BOLIEK_5.20.22

2022]

5/25/2022 1:33 PM

A TALE OF TWO MERGERS

943

In sum, the DOJ’s challenge to the AT&T-Time Warner merger was
unsuccessful,60 and the companies finalized the merger in 2018. To outside
observers, the DOJ’s challenge was always a long shot. Past economic and
judicial treatment of vertical mergers was overwhelmingly procompetitive, and
the overwhelming vertical nature of this merger was too high a hurdle for the
DOJ.61 Ultimately, even though the DOJ’s challenge did not succeed, the market
itself stepped in only a few years later to accomplish what antitrust regulators
could not.62 When antitrust regulators failed to find anticompetitive harm, there
was still another, more organic, line of defense in the market. This demonstrates
that while antitrust regulators are beneficial when they encourage market
investment, innovation, and growth, they are not the sole avenue for antitrust
enforcement.
II. THE DOJ, THE FCC, AND MERGER TWO: T-MOBILE AND SPRINT
In contrast, while the DOJ challenged the AT&T-Time Warner merger, the
DOJ analyzed and ultimately approved the merger between T-Mobile and
Sprint. A brief summary of the T-Mobile and Sprint merger is as follows. In the
middle of 2018, T-Mobile and Sprint announced their decision to merge.63 In the
press and to regulators, T-Mobile and Sprint claimed that the merger would
allow the merged company to rapidly create a nationwide 5G network, lower
costs, and provide better quality than either company could on its own.64
Because the merger involved transferring multiple spectrum licenses and
authorizations, it required FCC review along with the DOJ’s traditional merger
review.65 Both FCC and DOJ merger reviews involve extensive economic and
legal analyses to predict the potential effects of the proposed merger. Notably,
the DOJ applies the traditional consumer welfare standard of review that focuses
on limiting adverse impacts on consumers rather than on competitors. The DOJ
employs objective economic analysis to predict potential consumer harms and
consumer benefits, and to develop remedies or strategies to reduce or prevent
60

See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018).
Id. at 199 (“[T]he Government has not pointed to any prior trials in federal district court in which the
Antitrust Division has successfully used this increased-leverage theory to block a proposed vertical merger as
violative of Section 7.”).
62
See Kovach & Meredith, supra note 14.
63
See Press Release, T-Mobile, supra note 19.
64
See id.
65
See Harold Feld, The Need for FCC Merger Review, 18 COMMC’N LAW. 20, 20 (2000) (stating the FCC
has played a large role in regulating mergers in the telecommunication industry); Christopher S. Yoo, Merger
Review by the Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-NBC Universal, PENN. L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 5 (2014) (stating the FCC’s authority for merger review comes from the Communications Act of
1934).
61
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harms that outweigh the benefits.66 The FCC’s review uses similar analyses but,
in accordance with its governing statute, the FCC applies the more broadly
defined public interest standard of review. Namely, the FCC determines whether
the merger serves public interest, convenience, and necessity.67 Ultimately, both
the FCC and the DOJ approved the merger under their respective standards, and
each applied various conditions and requirements to the merger approval.68 This
Part II takes a closer look at the evolution of that decision.69
A. Background of the T-Mobile-Sprint Merger
T-Mobile and Sprint completed their merger in 2019.70 This merger was
significant, as it involved the combination of two of the four largest national
mobile networks.71 There was concern from the DOJ, FCC, and the general
public that the decrease from four to three national carriers could harm
competition and consumers. Arguably, however, the U.S. market for cellular
networks was already bifurcated into two separate markets—Verizon-AT&T
and T-Mobile-Sprint. Under this view, the merger could be seen as facilitating
T-Mobile’s move into a pre-existing duopoly—increasing that market from two
main participants up to three.72 In particular, the spectrum license holdings73 and

66
See Samuel Bowman, TL;DR–Consumer Welfare Standard, INT’L CTR. L. & ECON. (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://laweconcenter.org/resource/tldr-consumer-welfare-standard/ (“In antitrust law, the Consumer Welfare
Standard (CWS) directs courts to focus on the effects that challenged business practices have on consumers,
rather than on alleged harms to specific competitors.”). For a description of the consumer welfare model, see
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107–115 (1978).
67
47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2018); see also Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust:
How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1633 n.21 (2011) (“The FCC mandate of
regulating telecommunications for the ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’ is a standard praised by some
for its adaptability and central focus on the public wellbeing.”).
68
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Declaratory Ruling, and Order of Proposed Modification,
Applications of T-Mobile US, Inc., and Sprint Corporation for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and
Authorizations, 34 FCC Rec. 10578, at 5, ¶11 (Nov. 5, 2019); Proposed Conclusions of Law of the United States
at 56–57, United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-CV-02511 (D.D.C. May 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
case-document/file/1061066/download.
69
See Parts II.A, II.B.
70
See supra notes 21, 68.
71
See Edmund Lee, T-Mobile and Sprint Are Cleared to Merge as the Big Get Bigger, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/business/media/t-mobile-sprint-merger.html (“The longin-the-works merger would combine the nation’s third- and fourth-largest wireless carriers, creating a
telecommunications giant to take on AT&T and Verizon.”).
72
GUS HURWITZ, GEOFFREY A. MANNE, JULIAN MORRIS & KRISTIAN STOUT, INT’L CTR. L. & ECON.,
COMMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS TO DENY 4
(2018), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10918839300242/ICLE%20-%20Comments%20-%20TMobile-Sprint%20
Merger.pdf (“[I]n the market for nationwide 5G networks, this transaction amounts to a 2-to-3 merger, resulting
in the creation of a viable, new market entrant, instead of the 4-to-3 transaction as characterized by opponents.”).
73
See infra note 112.
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capital investments required to maintain a future-proof market presence, was a
main consideration that factored into the DOJ’s and FCC’s merger analysis.74 TMobile and Sprint’s spectrum combination were determined to work cohesively
and would make deploying a national 5G network more likely.75 According to
the companies, the merger would facilitate the development of a nationwide 5G
network, improve network coverage in rural areas, and increase competition
with providers of wired broadband.76
T-Mobile and Sprint put forth that the merger’s main benefit would be the
ability to offer consumers a network that could provide expanded coverage,
more capacity, and faster data rates.77 The companies argued that by merging
and combining their respective spectrum, they could remove any potential
network redundancy and reduce costs of deploying the network.78 More
specifically, the companies emphasized that the combination of their respective
low-band and mid-band spectrum would allow for increased coverage in rural
areas.79 Both companies also claimed that T-Mobile’s 5G network would
facilitate faster data rates that could compete with wired broadband.80
As part of their assessment of the various comments about the merger, FCC
economists analyzed whether and how much the horizontal merger between TMobile and Sprint would decrease competition.81 There was concern about the

74
See Memorandum Opinion and Order supra note 68, at 42, ¶ 98 (“[The FCC] note[s] that Sprint has
not widely deployed its 2.5 GHz spectrum assets and our technical analysis predicts that on a standalone basis it
would fail to cover nearly half of the country with 5G services on its 2.5 GHz spectrum, even assuming it has
the financial ability to reach its previously planned deployment level. The transaction will therefore significantly
increase the overall utilization of the 2.5 GHz spectrum. [The FCC] further notes that as a condition to consent,
the Commission is requiring a certain amount of mid-band spectrum to be deployed for 5G, which in turn will
benefit American consumers.”).
75
Id.
76
Boliek et al., supra note 57, at 643.
77
Id. at 640.
78
Id. at 640 n.22 (“To support their claims, the Applicants compared their Network Build Model’s
predictions for New T-Mobile’s network and associated costs relative to the networks of the stand-alone
companies.”).
79
Id. at 640 n.23 (“For instance, whereas T-Mobile had been deploying its low-band 600 MHz spectrum
in rural areas, the Applicants claimed that New T-Mobile’s access to complementary mid-band access would
enable improved speeds and more consistent signal levels.”).
80
Id. at 641 n.24 (“The Applicants also made various additional public interest claims: For instance, they
asserted that the proposed transaction would enable New T-Mobile to offer higher quality wholesale services at
lower prices to mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs); it would improve New T-Mobile’s ability to offer
appealing terms to roaming partners; it would permit the Applicants to achieve non-network savings in retail
distribution, advertising, equipment costs, repair and logistics, IT and billing, and other fixed general and
administrative costs; and it would enable New T-Mobile to be a more significant competitor for enterprise
customers.”).
81
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 68, at 75–77, ¶¶ 171–77.
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merger of two companies that compete in the same geographic and product
markets.82 Additionally, the FCC evaluated whether potential harms resulting
from the transaction would be balanced or outweighed by potential benefits.83
During the evaluation, the FCC looked at how customers viewed the companies
and whether they saw them as direct competitors. Additionally, the FCC
analyzed how quickly the new merged company could achieve any benefits
compared to the individual companies. Ultimately, the FCC approved the
transaction in May 2019, in part due to the parties’ commitments to divest
Sprint’s Boost Mobile business to Dish.84
B. The DOJ and FCC Decisions to Approve the T-Mobile-Sprint Merger
T-Mobile and Sprint filed their applications with the FCC on June 18, 2018,
seeking consent for T-Mobile to acquire Sprint’s FCC authorizations.85 The
companies filed certain commitments with the FCC on May 20, 2019. These
commitments included the divesture of Boost Mobile to Dish to reduce concerns
about reduced competition resulting from the merger.86 On July 26, 2019, as part
of the companies’ agreement with the DOJ, Dish agreed to acquire Boost.87 The
terms of the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint largely focused on the
development of a 5G network. To receive merger approval, T-Mobile needed to
agree to expand their 5G network to rural areas covering “[ninety-seven] percent
of the [U.S.] population in three years and [ninety-nine] percent in six years.”88
One of the reasons the DOJ agreed to the T-Mobile-Sprint merger was
because of the divesture to Dish, which had the potential to move Dish into
position to become a potential facilities-based provider of prepaid services
(wholesale and retail) in order to increase competition in a market exited by
Sprint.89 Dish would acquire Sprint’s prepaid brand in addition to Boost Mobile
82

Id. at 28–29, ¶ 66.
Id. at 168–69, ¶¶ 384–86.
84
Boliek et al., supra note 57, at 640.
85
See Public Notice, Commission Opens Docket for Proposed Transfer of Control of Sprint Corporation
to T-Mobile US, Inc., 33 FCC Rcd. 6046 (June 15, 2018) (announcing that T-Mobile and Sprint planned to file
with the FCC on June 18, 2018).
86
See generally Letter from Sprint Corp. and T-Mobile U.S., Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n (May 20, 2019) (available at https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/t-mobile-us-sprintletter-05202019.pdf).
87
In the Matter of Applications of T-Mobile US, Inc., and Sprint Corporation for Consent to Transfer
Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Order of Modification and Extension of Time to Construct, 35 FCC
Rcd. 9580, 9581, ¶ 2 (Sept. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Applications of T-Mobile and Sprint].
88
Julian Chokkattu, What the T-Mobile and Sprint Merger Means for You, WIRED (Aug. 31, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/t-mobile-sprint-merger-guide/.
89
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 21 (“Under the terms of the proposed settlement, T-Mobile
83
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and would take over some of Sprint’s retail stores. Dish would utilize TMobile’s network for seven years while it would work to build its own service
and 5G network.90 The terms of the DOJ’s proposed settlement with T-Mobile
and Sprint required the divesture of Sprint’s prepaid business, Boost Mobile,
Virgin Mobile, and Sprint prepaid to Dish Network.91 The settlement also
required certain spectrum assets to be divested to Dish. T-Mobile and Sprint also
were required to allow Dish to utilize “at least 20,000 cell sites and hundreds of
retail locations” and allow Dish to access T-Mobile’s network for seven years to
develop its own 5G network.92
C. The Results
After two years of scrutiny by the FCC, the DOJ, various state attorney
generals, and state regulators, including a legal challenge in district court, the TMobile-Sprint merger was completed.93 All merger review involves some
speculation as to the post-merger world.94 Review is particularly difficult when
it includes calculating the impact of the merger in an industry that itself is
changing rapidly.

and Sprint must divest Sprint’s prepaid business, including Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and Sprint prepaid, to
Dish Network Corp. . . .).
90
Id.; see Applications of T-Mobile and Sprint, supra note 87, at 9581, ¶ 2.
91
See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 21.
92
See id. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
issued this statement:
With this merger and accompanying divestiture, we are expanding output significantly by
ensuring that large amounts of currently unused or underused spectrum are made available to
American consumers in the form of high quality 5G networks . . . . Today’s settlement will
provide Dish with the assets and transitional services required to become a facilities-based mobile
network operator that can provide a full range of mobile wireless services nationwide. I want to
thank our state partners for joining us in this settlement. . . . In crafting this remedy, we are also
mindful of the significant commitments T-Mobile, Sprint, and Dish have made to the Federal
Communications Commission.
Id.
93
For example, both the FCC and DOJ scrutinized the potential impact the merger would have on the
prepaid mobile market. Although arguably a separate market from the larger, subscription market to be combined
by the merger, because AT&T and Verizon provided little wholesale services compared to Sprint and T-Mobile,
both the FCC and DOJ required the merged company to make spinoff commitments of licenses and business
divisions that might support the entry of a new facilities-based wholesaler. See Babette Boliek, Competition,
Regulation, and 5G, in THE GLOBAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 837, 850–53
(2020).
94
By its nature, merger review is “guessing” what a post-merger world might look like. That fact does
not change by the imposition of bright-line rules that shift burdens to prevent mergers of certain structural
characteristics. Bright-line rules are arguably a greater pre-merger “guess” as to the post-merger analysis than
case-by-case analyses.

BOLIEK_5.20.22

948

5/25/2022 1:33 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

Here, the great weight given to the historic architectural shift of the mobile
industry known as 5G was particularly evident in both the DOJ and FCC reviews
of the T-Mobile merger.95 To distill it to a granular level, it could be argued that
if 5G (largely undeployed at the time of the merger) is indeed the technology of
the future—that which will drive competition and contribute to consumer
welfare—then there was much to recommend the merger to regulators. If it
proves not to be so, there is much more to criticize about the merger decision.
As noted, and further described below, AT&T appears to echo the FCC’s and
DOJ’s conclusions about the importance of high-cost, 5G infrastructure
investment.
III. HOW ANTITRUST ACTION HELPED END THE AT&T-TIME WARNER
MERGER
Although the DOJ attempted to stop the AT&T-Time Warner merger by
litigation, the approval of the T-Mobile merger seems to have been part of
AT&T’s undoing.96 AT&T’s CEO John Stankey outlined multiple reasons for
the split, including AT&T’s desire to focus on building up its 5G network.97
Telecommunication companies have been motivated by 5G for multiple years,
starting with the T-Mobile merger with Sprint on April 1, 2020.98 This merger
successfully allowed the merged company, New T-Mobile, to focus its attention
on expanding 5G coverage for its customers.99 After the T-Mobile-Sprint
merger, other wireless carriers, including AT&T, were left trailing in the 5G
race. After AT&T’s split with WarnerMedia, AT&T refocused its efforts on
increasing its 5G coverage.100

95
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 68, at 3, ¶¶ 2–3 (“Building leading 5G networks is
of critical importance for our nation.”).
96
See Press Release, AT&T, supra note 15.
97
Id. It should be noted that on the content side, the merged company also faced very real competition
from already established over-the-top content providers. Far from being a dominant threat to these over-the-top
operators as argued by the DOJ, the merged company was best understood to be an entrant to the market. See
Feiner, supra note 18.
98
Boliek, supra note 93, at 851–52; Drew Fitzgerald, T-Mobile Absorbs Sprint After Two-Year Battle,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/t-mobile-absorbs-sprint-after-two-year-battle-11585749352 (Apr. 1,
2020, 12:10 PM) (“T-Mobile US Inc. closed its takeover of Sprint Corp. Wednesday after a nearly two-year
battle with federal and state authorities.”).
99
See Fitzgerald, supra note 98.
100
See AT&T Chief Executive Officer John Stankey Updates Shareholders, AT&T (May 24, 2021)
[hereinafter AT&T CEO Updates Shareholders], https://about.att.com/story/2021/att_chief_executive_officer_
updates_shareholders.html (published on AT&T’s Newsroom).
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A. AT&T Split With WarnerMedia
In May of 2021, AT&T announced that it was selling the recently acquired
WarnerMedia to Discovery.101 This announcement came only three short years
after AT&T won a hard-fought battle against the DOJ.102 The reasons for
combining WarnerMedia and Discovery cited by AT&T CEO John Stankey
included the following: the success of media and communications operations of
AT&T supported this separation, the combination of WarnerMedia and
Discovery would increase AT&T’s financial flexibility, and the combination
would provide the opportunity to improve AT&T’s market position and increase
its investment in the communication business; in other words, 5G.103 AT&T also
stated that after the deal closed, the capital structure improvements would place
AT&T as one of the “best capitalized 5G and fiber broadband companies” in the
country.104 AT&T expected about $24 billion in annual capital expenditures and
expects “its 5G C-band network to cover 200 million people in the U.S. by yearend 2023.”105
B. The Importance of Tech in High-Tech Industries
The technology central to the T-Mobile-Sprint merger and also to the
AT&T-Time Warner breakup is 5G. 5G is more than an update to 4G. 5G is a
major change in architecture that has the potential to facilitate the development
of other innovations.106 As compared to 4G, 5G offers increased bandwidth,
increased upload and download speeds, better input efficiencies, and decreased
latency.107 Data rates are expected to be in the 100s of Megabits per second
(Mbps), as compared to 4G’s current 10s of Mbps.108 5G improvements will
hopefully also bring increased efficiencies leading to decreased costs, increased
quality, and increased competition.109
To achieve these potential 5G benefits, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)
will need to undergo architectural innovation such as increased spectral
efficiency, densification, increased data capacity, and potentially the transition

101

Press Release, AT&T, supra note 15.
See United States v. AT&T Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
103
AT&T CEO Updates Shareholders, supra note 100.
104
Press Release, AT&T, supra note 15.
105
AT&T CEO Updates Shareholders, supra note 100.
106
Boliek, supra note 93, at 839.
107
WILLIAM LEHR, THE FUTURE OF BROADBAND COMPETITION IN A 5G WORLD 6–7 (2018), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3240191.
108
Id. at 6.
109
Boliek, supra note 93, at 840.
102
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from the current Radio Access Network (RAN) to Open Radio Access Networks
(O-RAN).110 First, 5G allows for increased spectral efficiency.111 5G can use
levels of spectrum previously unavailable to other generations.112 Spectrum
ranges from low-band (below 1 gigahertz (GHz))113 to mid-band (between 1 and
6 GHz)114 to high-band (above 24 GHz).115 Low-band spectrum covers a larger
geographic area, which makes it ideal for rural coverage, but at lower speeds of
about 30–250 Mbps.116 Mid-band spectrum covers a smaller area than low-band
but at slightly faster speeds of about 100–900 Mbps.117 High-band spectrum
provides high speed mobile broadband between 1 and 3 gigabits per second
(Gbps) but covers a very small area.118 T-Mobile and Sprint cited combining
their spectrum levels to facilitate a larger 5G network as one of the main benefits
to come from their merger.119 The merger allowed T-Mobile to acquire over 100
MHz of mid-band (2.5GHz) spectrum, which the companies anticipated
facilitating the spread of 5G.120
Another architectural innovation of 5G is the densification of the mobile
networks by MNOs.121 This densification will involve the installation of
numerous small cells on tall buildings or telephone towers, resulting in higher
quality mobile broadband for consumers, especially in urban areas where
buildings are so close together.122 A third 5G benefit is increased data capacity
of the 5G network. This increased capacity will allow more than one network to
run on a single infrastructure and utilize the same spectrum. This will increase
efficiency while at the same time decrease costs.123

110

Id. at 840–42.
Id.
112
Id.
113
GSMA, 5G SPECTRUM: PUBLIC POLICY POSITION 6 (2021), https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/5G-Spectrum-Positions.pdf.
114
5G Spectrum Bands Explained—Low, Mid and High Band, NOKIA, https://www.nokia.com/networks/
insights/spectrum-bands-5g-world/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
115
GSMA, supra note 113.
116
Jeremy Horwitz, The Definitive Guide to 5G, Low, Mid, and High Band Speeds, VENTURE BEAT
(Dec. 10, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/12/10/the-definitive-guide-to-5g-low-mid-and-highband-speeds/.
117
Id.
118
GSMA, supra note 113.
119
See Boliek, supra note 93, at 848 n.36.
120
Monica Alleven, T-Mobile CEO Touts Mid-Band Spectrum Lead in 5G, FIERCE WIRELESS (Dec. 9,
2020, 11:38 PM), https://www.fiercewireless.com/operators/t-mobile-ceo-boasts-mid-band-spectrum-lead.
121
See Boliek, supra note 93, at 840.
122
Christopher S. Yoo & Jesse Lambert, 5G and Net Neutrality, PENN. L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 6 (2019), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2089.
123
Boliek, supra note 93, at 841.
111
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5G may also facilitate the potential move from the standard Radio Access
Network (RAN) technology to Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN).124 With
current RAN technology, the hardware provider also provides the software;
however, with O-RAN, there are two different providers for hardware and
software.125 This facilitates flexibility in the network design and could decrease
costs to consumers while increasing network efficiencies and competition.126
C. AT&T’s Focus on 5G
AT&T’s quick turnaround—from purchasing Time Warner to focus on their
media and content business to selling WarnerMedia only three years later to
focus on 5G—demonstrates 5G’s continued importance to telecom companies.
AT&T’s focus on 5G comes almost a year after the approved merger between
T-Mobile and Sprint in June 2020.127 Interestingly, the importance of 5G’s
potential had to be assumed by the DOJ and FCC for merger review. This
assumption, based on experience, has yet to be fully realized in consumer
demand. Indeed, in one survey only 25% of wireless consumers feel that the 5G
network is better than their current 4G LTE service and “only 5% said they are
willing to switch [from 4G] to 5G.”128 Even so, all three mobile companies are
racing to develop a 5G network. In 2021, T-Mobile offered lower prices than
both AT&T and Verizon and was the closest of the three telecommunication
companies to offering a nationwide 5G network.129 Prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, AT&T and Verizon planned to increase their 5G advertising with the
hope of attracting more customers to their respective networks.130 Currently, TMobile has the fastest 5G download speed of the three companies, with an
average of 87.5 Mbps ahead of AT&T and Verizon, which both had 52.3

124

Id. at 842.
Id.
126
Id.; CHIH-LIN ET AL., O-RAN ALLIANCE, O-RAN: TOWARDS AN OPEN AND SMART RAN 6 (2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ad774cce74940d7115044b0/t/5bc79b371905f4197055e8c6/153980805
7078/O-RAN+WP+FInal+181017.pdf.
127
See Roger Conrad, T-Mobile US: The Sprint Merger So Far, FORBES (June 23, 2020, 9:26 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2020/06/23/t-mobile-us-the-sprint-merger-so-far/?sh=3d5efeac
271b.
128
Sophie Webster, Verizon and AT&T Pushes for More 5G Campaign as Pandemic Caused Consumers
to Question its Benefits, TECH TIMES (Aug. 7, 2021, 12:08 PM), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/263883/
20210807/verizon-t-shelves-5g-campaign-pandemic-caused-consumers-question-benefits.htm.
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Mbps.131 Additionally, T-Mobile is ahead of AT&T and Verizon on 5G
availability and 5G reach.132 T-Mobile also leads the other two companies on
5G download and upload speed.133 However, AT&T is ahead of the other two
companies regarding the 5G video experience and Verizon leads the 5G gaming
experience for consumers.134 All three telecom companies are still attempting to
expand and develop their respective 5G network; however, they are all
struggling to engage consumers, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In March 2021, at AT&T’s Analyst & Investor Day, AT&T announced some
of its long-term goals to bring “fast, reliable and secure 5G to more consumers,
businesses and first responders.”135 AT&T’s focus is to bring 5G to “sports and
venues, entertainment, travel and transportation, business transformation, and
security and public safety.”136 According to AT&T, their 5G network covers 230
million Americans in about 14,000 cities and towns.137 AT&T plans to bring
5G+ to seventeen sports venues including stadiums, arenas, and practice areas,
across the United States by the end of 2021.138 Additionally, AT&T plans to
bring 5G to universities, including the University of Miami, Purdue University,
and others by the end of 2021.139 Furthermore, in February 2021, AT&T
announced a public-private partnership with the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) where AT&T provided 5G capabilities to the VA Puget Sound
Health Care System in Seattle, Washington.140 This partnership will provide the
VA Puget Sound with “real-time, high-bandwidth, low-latency access to latency
dependent mobile applications.”141 These 5G goals came slightly before
AT&T’s announcement to combine WarnerMedia with Discovery in May 2021.
This decision further highlights AT&T’s focus on and dedication to expanding
its 5G network.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past year, two mergers have occurred in the high-tech industry of
telecommunication—T-Mobile-Sprint and AT&T-Time Warner—and both
received much scrutiny from antitrust authorities. In both cases, the merger
ultimately went forward—one with regulatory and DOJ approval, the other by
judicial decision. The first merger between T-Mobile and Sprint is still in effect,
while AT&T and Time Warner recently decided to split on their own after a
short time. What these two transactions share is a focus on expanding a 5G
network nationwide. The T-Mobile-Sprint merger and subsequent AT&TWarnerMedia split both prove that the tech in the industry, 5G, is a dynamic,
competitive challenge facing all participants in the telecommunications industry
today.142
Here are two examples of a majority of the large telecommunication
companies making monumental business decisions in part to facilitate the
development of a nationwide 5G network. Even the antitrust regulators view a
5G network as a worthy goal, as demonstrated by their approval of the T-Mobile
Sprint merger. Only a few short years after T-Mobile and Sprint merged, AT&T
has also made impactful business decisions to narrow their focus on 5G. Even
though customers may be slow to appreciate 5G’s full benefits,143 telecom
companies and antitrust regulators have both seen that 5G is the way of the notso-distant future.
Additionally, although both mergers went forward, they each had different
market outcomes. This result illustrates the market’s important role in the
success or failure of a merger. Despite the DOJ’s objections, Time Warner
merged and then split on their own. The resulting AT&T and Time Warner
combination was not as successful as the companies hoped. Therefore, they
separated.144 While this likely would have occurred without DOJ interference, it
just may have happened a few years earlier and saved administrative resources
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and taxpayer money spent litigating the case.145 There is no doubt that merger
review is an essential tool for both regulators and antitrust enforcers who are
entrusted to protect the public interest and competition for the American
consumers’ benefit. Ex ante merger review, even when done with meticulous
care, can provide only the experts’ best prediction for the ultimate post-merger
world. These two mergers provide a reminder of the difficulty of the analysis,
the good faith of the reviewers, and the humility even an educated hypothesis
can render.
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(describing the failure of the AOL-Time Warner merger and analogizing it to the combination of AT&T, “a
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